Research

Journal Articles

Should Effective Altruists Maximise Expected Utility? Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. [pre-print]

Abstract Expected Value Theory is often assumed to offer the comprehensive theory of rational choice. If this is true, then rationality requires that we sometimes take enormous risks – specifically, when we are faced with options that have very low probability and very high value. This implication underpins some recent ethical views about our obligations to the extreme long-term future: consequentialist commitments to impartiality and doing the most good as efficiently as possible appear to imply that effective altruists should prioritize the extreme long-term future. I argue that the reasoning that leads to this conclusion rests on an overly narrow understanding of rationality, one that leaves out substantive and structural rational requirements. I show how, once we take account of these, we see that rational effective altruists should not always maximize expected value.

The Value of Incoherence. Philosophical Issues, 2024. [https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12266] [Pre-Print]

Abstract I argue that level-incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level-incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy. Nevertheless, level-incoherent combinations exhibit a distinctive tension, and this tension has been thought by many to indicate that level-incoherence is always irrational. Although this idea has proved resilient, I argue that it is incorrect. I evaluate three candidate explanations for the distinctive tension exhibited by level-incoherent combinations, only one of which is the traditional view (which I call the ‘Prohibition View’) that epistemic level-incoherence is prohibited by epistemic rationality. I argue instead for the ‘Inquiry View’, according to which level-incoherence is not rationally criticisable but is a reason to undertake further inquiry.

Rational Belief, Epistemic Possibility, and the A Priori. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2024. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y]

Abstract In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.

Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms. Erkenntnis, 2022. With Bruno Jacinto. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00599-7]

Abstract Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, the Knowledge Norm and the Truth Norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative.

At Least You Tried: the Value of De Dicto Concern to Do the Right Thing. Philosophical Studies, 2022. [doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01791-9]

Abstract I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important (de re, and not de dicto) in moral evaluation (for example, Arpaly 2002; Arpaly and Schroeder 2013; Harman 2015; Weatherson 2019). In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important (de re), does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views under discussion cannot accommodate this, and should be amended to recognise that it is often praiseworthy to be motivated to do what is right (de dicto).

Giving Up the Enkratic Principle. Logos & Episteme, 2021. [doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20211211]

Abstract The Enkratic Principle enjoys something of a protected status as a requirement of rationality. I argue that this status is undeserved, at least in the epistemic domain. Compliance with the principle should not be thought of as a requirement of epistemic rationality, but rather as defeasible indication of epistemic blamelessness. To show this, I present the Puzzle of Inconsistent Requirements, and argue that the best way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish two kinds of epistemic evaluation – requirement and appraisal. This allows us to solve the puzzle while accommodating traditional motivations for thinking of the Enkratic Principle as a requirement of rationality.

Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2021. [doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10212-5]

Abstract De Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality. Acta Analytica, 2020. [doi.org/10.1007/s12136-020-00450-0]

Abstract I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent’s situation, and change depending on what that situation is like (Bradley, 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those concerning what epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being ‘fixed points’ – it is impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them (Smithies, 2012; Titelbaum, 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permit a solution to downstream theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens that we should avoid.

Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry.  Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2019. [Pre-Print] [doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20182687]

Abstract
    Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions. Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between normative and factual uncertainty by considering the particular features of the cases in greater detail. Such consideration shows that, in fact, normative and factual uncertainty are equally relevant to moral assessment.

It’s OK to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis. Episteme, 2019. [doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.33]

Abstract
    Can we make mistakes about what rationality requires? A natural answer is that we can, since it is a platitude that rational belief does not require truth; it is possible for a belief to be rational and mistaken, and this holds for any subject matter at all. However, the platitude causes trouble when applied to rationality itself. The possibility of rational mistakes about what rationality requires generates a puzzle. When combined with two further plausible claims – the enkratic principle, and the claim that rational requirements apply universally – we get the result that rationality generates inconsistent requirements. One popular and attractive solution to the puzzle denies that it is possible to make rational mistakes about what rationality requires. I show why (contra Titelbaum (2015b), and Littlejohn (2015) this solution is doomed to fail. Consequently, we are left with the surprising result that solving the puzzle will require pursuing one of three highly unintuitive solutions that have so far not proved popular – we must accept that rationality sometimes generates dilemmas, reject the enkratic principle, or defend a conception of rationality for which the requirements of rationality do not apply universally.

Papers in Edited Collections

Being Wrong About Logic. Forthcoming in G. Melis, G. Merlo, and C. Wright (Eds.) Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori. Oxford University Press. [Pre-Print]

Abstract Is it possible to be rationally mistaken about logic? While the possibility of rational mistakes about any topic, including logic, seems intuitively plausible this possibility is called into question if we accept both an anti-akrasia requirement of rationality and think that logic is normative for belief. I show how this anti-akrasia requirement bears on the possibility of rational mistakes about logic, and argue that the right way to respond to it is to distinguish the normative domains that conflicting requirements belong to. I argue that we should think of logical and epistemic requirements as belonging to distinct domains. Once we do this, anti-akrasia requirements do not imply that rational mistakes about logic are impossible. One upshot of this is that logic turns out to be epistemically unexceptional.

Embracing Incoherence. Forthcoming in N. Hughes (Ed.) Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. [Pre-Print]

Abstract Incoherence is usually regarded as A Bad Thing. Incoherence suggests irrationality, confusion, paradox. Incoherentism disagrees: incoherence is not always a bad thing, sometimes we ought to be incoherent. If correct, Incoherentism has important and controversial implications. It implies that rationality does not always require coherence. After identifying some important differences between these two ways of embracing conflict, I offer some reasons to prefer Incoherentism over Dilemmism. Namely, that Incoherentism allows us to deliberate about what we ought to believe using ordinary epistemology, and it does a better job of accommodating the positive features of incoherence.

Neurodiversity and Epistemic Appraisal. Under contract for Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, K. Sylvan (Ed.).

Abstract Neurodiversity is the idea that many psychological traits commonly conceived of as deficiencies are better described merely as differences in styles of human cognition. Epistemic appraisal sorts good cognition from bad, so should be particularly aware of when cognition that departs from the norm is different, rather than deficient. Neurodiversity as a movement takes the view that these different “neuroatypical” ways of thinking are worthy of equal acceptance, respect, and recognition as “neurotypical” cognition. Neurodiversity is a term first used by those diagnosed with autism, but has also been applied to cognition associated with attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, developmental dyspraxia, dyslexia, epilepsy, and Tourette’s syndrome. The neurodiversity movement is opposed not only to the pathologizing of neurodiverse cognition, but also social hierarchies set up with exclusively neurotypical cognition in mind (Fenton & Krahn 2007).

Risky Trade-offs in The Expanse. In: Nicholas JL (ed.) The Expanse and Philosophy: So Far Out into the Darkness. London: Wiley. With Stefano Lo Re. [doi.org/10.1002/9781119755630.ch19]

Abstract The Expanse does not provide an easy answer to the vexing question on making a decision when competing, but considering conflicts of values on the show can help us reason about tough choices in real life. Sometimes, scientific progress conflicts with the prudential value of self-preservation. This chapter explains three ways of understanding value conflicts: as situations in which every option is forbidden, situations in which every option is permissible, or situations in which some options are obligatory and some options are forbidden. The idea that all these different kinds of value can be traded with a common currency is tempting. But contra Keats, beauty is not truth; and it certainly is not goodness, as Tolstoy says. Epistemic, moral, prudential, and aesthetic values are very different.

Recent and Upcoming Talks

February 2025 Is Incoherence Always Incoherent? Aristotelian Society, London.

September 2024. Reasonable Adjustments for Attentional Normativity (with Kurt Sylvan). British Society for the Theory of Knowledge.

May 2024 The Value of Incoherence. University of Fribourg.

March 2024 The Value of Incoherence. University of Neu-Chatel.

January 2024 The Value of Incoherence. University of Konstanz.

December 2023 Rational Agents Don’t Always Maximise Expected Utility. Institute of Future Studies, Stockholm.

November 2023 Normative Risk and Normative Recklessness. Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group.

September 2023 Coherence and Level-Incoherence. European Network for the Philosophy of Logic Conference, University of Bonn.

May 2023 Rational Incoherence. Keynote talk for Scottish Graduate Conference in Applied Epistemology, Glasgow.

May 2023 Reckless Choices and Transformative Experience. Varieties of Risk Transformative Experience Workshop.

March 2023 “Normative Risk and Normative Recklessness”. Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group.

January 2023 “Being Wrong about Logic”. University of Turin.

January 2023 “Risk, Rationality, and Recklessness”. Epistemology and Mathematics Series, IUSS, Pavia.

October 2022 “Logic and Incoherentism“. MCMP Workshop on the Normativity of Logic, LMU Munich.

October 2022 “Being Wrong About Logic”. European Philosophy of Logic Network Annual Conference, University of Padua.

October 2022 “The Value of Incoherence”. COGITO Workshop on Inquiry, Glasgow.

July 2022 “Normative Risk and Normative Recklessness”. Law, Knowledge, and the Mind Workshop, UCL.

July 2022 “Epistemic Squandering“. SEECRs Workshop, Edinburgh.

July 2022 “Aesthetic Recklessness”. Scottish Aesthetics Forum Workshop on Aesthetics and Social Epistemology, St Andrews.

June 2022 “Recklessness and Rationality“. Narrow Ridge Epistemology Workshop.

May 2022 “Normative Mistakes in the Epistemic Domain”. Southampton Normativity Group.

Feel free to email me at claire.a.field [at] gmail [dot] com for drafts of works in progress.

Book Reviews